Introduction
The traditional interpretation of corporate fi nance is characterized by ownership. Although, their rights are widely distributed among individual stockholders, but can be managed by few managers. Hence, confl ict of interest is arisen among managers and shareholders and this results in an agency problem (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . A number of empirical studies also confi rmed the ownership concentration of fi rms, especially those dominated by few large owners or block-holders (La Porta et al., 1999) . The concentrated structure of ownership also contributes towards agency confl ict between block-holders and minority shareholders. From another perspective, the block-holders can benefi t minority shareholders by their role in monitoring managers and also can be hazardous if they strive to achieve their own private goals (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) .
The three main aspects of ownership, which have been widely discussed in the past three decades, include concentrated ownership by block-holders, families and other groups, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership. The third aspect has gained importance as shareholding by institutional investors has increased in the US from 17% in 1970 to nearly 70% in the previous decade (Bushee & Noe, 2000) . Meanwhile, in the case of Pakistan, nearly 25% of the common stock is owned by local and foreign institutional investors (Easterly, 2001 ). Institutional ownership is defi ned in the literature as the percentage of fi rm's shares owned by institutional investors and it can also be defi ned as one minus percentage of shares held by individual investors (Firth et al., 2016) . Consequently, institutional investors play an effective monitoring role in the invested fi rms. Initially, early research mainly focused on the analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and fi rm performance (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Duggal & Millar, 1999) . Later on, the relationship between institutional ownership and different domains of corporate governance have opened additional research horizon, i.e. Karpoff et al. (1996) , Johnson and Greening (1999) , Mak and Li (2001) .
Institutional investors have diverse preferences for the fi rms in which they invest. A number of studies carried out to determine the preferences of institutional investors in terms of fi rms' corporate governance and other policies. Badrinath, Kale, and Ryan (1996) investigate the idea that institutional investors favor stocks that have higher market liquidity and lower return volatility. Others also confi rmed that institutional investors value the stocks of companies with superior disclosure (Bushee & Noe, 2000) , those that would pay cash dividends or repurchase shares (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005) , and also those demonstrate better managerial performance (Parrino et al., 2003) . Nevertheless, Cull and Xu (2005) have stressed the role of institutional investors in investment decisions, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) claimed the effects of dividend policy decisions and others in leverage or capital structure decisions (Bokpin & Arko, 2009; Chung & Wang, 2014) . Most importantly, this study aims at determining the simultaneous effects of institutional ownership on fi rms' strategic fi nancial decisions.
Thus, the interdependence of fi rms' strategic decisions set a problem of endogeneity, leading 1, XXII, 2019 Finance to a causal two-way relationship between them. Leverage or capital structure decisions are affected by dividend decisions and these choices also have an infl uence on the leverage decisions of a fi rm (Al-Najjar & Taylor, 2008) . However, studies have considered the endogeneity between institutional ownership and payout policy (Chang, Kang, & Li, 2016) , ownership and fi rms' value (Afza & Nazir, 2015) and fi rms' performance (Maquieira, Espinosa, & Vieito, 2011) , this phenomenon seems to be particularly interesting in the case of the Pakistani, where the level of institutional ownership is high and considerable.
The main purpose of this study is to analyze relationships among institutional ownership and the fi rms' strategic decisions relating to the leverage, the capital structure, dividend decisions and related investment decisions. This paper is organized as follows. Section II highlights previous literature and proposes our hypotheses. Section III details the sample and research design used for analysis. Section IV includes the results of empirical examination and the discussion of its consequences. Section V concludes and highlights the importance of institutional ownership in fi rms' decision.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The agency theory suggests that optimal investors have a strong interest in monitoring fi rms' management capital structure and ownership structure, which support fi rms to minimize their agency costs (Jensen, 1986) . Agency costs are attributed to the arise confl ict of interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identifi ed two main types of confl icts, i.e. confl icts of interest between the shareholders and managers, and confl icts between the shareholders and debtholders. Keeping managers' absolute investment in fi rms' constant, an increase in the ratio of debt fi nancing increases the managers' share of equity and therefore, it reduces the loss from any confl ict between managers and shareholders. Moreover, since the debt requires the fi rm to pay out cash as a cost of debt, this reduces the amount of free-cash available to managers and in turn reduces the confl ict of interest. Previous literature on institutional ownership has proposed these solutions in order to gain benefi ts by enhancing fi rms' value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 Since, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that dividend policy does not affect the value of the fi rm, different empirical studies have been conducted to investigate the dividend puzzle. Truong and Heaney (2007) also reported that the fi rms pay dividends and are inclined to pay more dividends when they have high levels of profi tability and low levels of investment opportunities. The classical agency theory perspective holds the view that fi rms are likely to share more of their profi ts with investors when they face lower monitoring costs (Jensen, 1986) . It also holds that the largest shareholder may reduce agency costs by reducing the amount of free cash fl ow to managerial discretion by increasing fi rms' payouts. Meanwhile, the literature provides some evidence on the relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend decisions of fi rms. Firth et al. (2016) and Short et al. (2002) confi rmed a positive correlation between institutional shareholding and the dividend payouts of fi rms. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) found a positive relationship between share repurchases and institutional holdings. According to their fi ndings, fi rms that repurchase more shares attract more institutional investments. Their results also suggest that institutional investors prefer fi rms that repurchase shares regularly. Based on this discussion, our second proposition regarding the relation between institutional ownership and dividend is the following:
H2: The percentage of stock ownership by institutional investors is positively related to the dividend payment of the fi rms. Bushee (1998) demonstrates that the short-term focus of many institutional investors induces some fi rms to reduce R&D when earnings are expected to decline. On the basis of the investment horizon and preferences, institutional investors are classifi ed as 'transient institutions', highlighted managers' myopic behavior. The other two types of these 2019, XXII, 1 Finance institutions are 'dedicated 1 and 'quasi-indexer' institutions. These institutional investors have stable ownership in fi rms and are less focused on short-term earnings. The relation between the investment decisions of fi rms and institutional ownership as proposed in the literature is not so straightforward. However, investment is one of the most important aspects through which institutional owners can affect a fi rm. A positive relation between investment and ownership was confi rmed by Pindado and Torre (2006) , whereas Richardson (2006) reports that managers of fi rms with large institutional ownership are less likely to overinvest surplus cash, due to the monitoring governance activities of institutions. Considering Bushee's (1998) myopic investor hypothesis to be more relevant in the context of Pakistani institutional investors (in terms of the short-term horizon and lack of information), the relationship is proposed as, H3: The percentage of stock ownership by institutional investors is negatively related to the investment of the fi rms.
Debt and dividend can substitute or complement one another in reducing agency costs. These kinds of strategies auxiliary well if convergence of interest is strong (Rozeff, 1982) . If the entrenchment hypothesis of Farinha (2002) is effective these decisions are complement. Believing on this, our study proposes a negative relation between leverage and dividends.
H4: The leverage of the fi rm is negatively related to the dividend.
Some early studies examined how fi rms' optimum debt preference affects investment decisions. Smith and Warner (1979) argued that debt can bound a fi rm's ability to employ an asset substitution, while Berkovitch and Kim (1990) discuss that project fi nance and secured debt support to resolve investment incentive problems. Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) indicated that placing bank debt at the top of the fi rm's priorities fully exploits tax shield benefi ts of interests. Studying interactions between investments and fi nancing decisions, they examined the idea that a dynamic trade-off between priority, capital structure and investment incentives yields important additional insights and further empirical predictions. Based on the literature we assumed that:
H5: Leverage is negatively related to fi rms' investment decisions.
However, the investment of fi rms also affects their dividend policy decisions. The relationships among the dividend and investment decision policies are evidenced from the theoretical background of Miller and Modigliani (1961) . This theory argues that in a perfect capital market, optimal investment decisions by a fi rm are independent of how such decisions are fi nanced. This core theory has also an important outcome as investment decisions should not be determined by dividends, and dividend decisions need not be affected by investment decisions. In this perspective, Fama (1974) provided empirical evidence of violence to this theorem. Since then, there is no evidence for an existed relation between dividend and investment decisions that require treating them via simultaneous equations models (SEM). For those fi rms which have great investment opportunities, payment of dividends must be balanced with the long-term goals of fi rms (Myers & Majluf, 1984) . Crutchley et al. (1999) found a negative two-way relationship between dividend and investment decisions. An increased dividend can lead to reduced funds available for investment and hence results in a decreased dividend probability for the future (Cyert et al., 1996) . Hence, we can also assume that:
H6: The dividend is negatively related to the investment decisions of fi rms.
Our corresponding hypothesis regarding the relation among institutional ownership and leverage, dividend and investment decisions are summarized in Fig. 1 .
Sample and Research Design
The data used for this study is comprised of a sample taken from non-fi nancial fi rms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). Total statistics of this study include all listed fi rms in 33 different sectors. A sample of 170 fi rms belonging to eight different sectors were considered for analysis between 1994 and 2014. The selection of the sample depends upon the availability of all the required data. Financial fi rms, fi rms with negative equity and fi rms whose relevant data is incomplete or not available are excluded from this sample. Moreover, our analyses are based on annual frequency of data, in order to align fi nancial statements results and institutional ownership variables. In this study, a sectoral approach is also used, following King and Santor (2008) . 1, XXII, 2019
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The variables extracted from the Balance Sheet Analysis (BSA) publication of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) (2018) include capital structure decisions captured by the following factors:   leverage (LEV), which measured by debt to equity ratio (Hassan & Butt, 2009 ),   dividend payouts (DPO), as the ratio of dividend per share to earnings per share (Afza & Nazir, 2015) ,
by the ratio of Change in Fixed Assets to Total Assets in place of R&D expenditures (Jensen et al., 1992) ,   Return on Equity (ROE), as the ratio of net income to shareholders' equity (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) ,   size of fi rm (Size) equals with the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets is used (Lin & Chang, 2011) ,   tangibility (TANG) of assets is measured as the ratio of fi xed assets to the total assets of fi rm (Liu et al., 2011),   Sales growth (Sales_GR) is calculated as the annual percentage change in sales of a company (Lin & Chang, 2011) ,   age of fi rm (Age) is defi ned as the log of number of years elapsed since a fi rm was listed (Roy, 2015) ,
, as the percentage of shares owned by institutional investors of the total number of shares outstanding (Michaely & Vincent, 2013) . INST is taken from annual reports of individual companies, reported under the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan (CCGP),   and the dividend decisions of fi rms are captured by dividend yield (DY), as the ratio of the dividend per share to market price per share (Bradford et al., 2013) .
In the method identifi ed for this study, there is a potential causality or endogenous relationship among leverage decisions, dividend decisions and investment decisions. A simple ordinary least square (OLS) estimation to capture the relationship among these variables will create biased and inconsistent estimates, as given by (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) . Hence, there is a need to explore a more sophisticated econometrics technique for analysis. There are different ways to address the issue of biased and inconsistent estimates. One of them is 2SLS, the others are 3SLS and GMM. 3SLS has advantages over 2SLS, as with the former to capture cross equation impacts of error terms and the system of equation is supposed to be correlated in 3SLS (Zellner & Theil, 1962) . 
This study is based on the 3SLS methodology in order to analyze the simultaneous determination of fi nancial decisions and their possible two-way causality. 3SLS is always preferred in term of the inherent effi ciency of its estimates over 2SLS (Kapteyn & Fiebig, 1981) . 3SLS is the most appropriate technique for this data set if a system estimator is considered rather than one equation. This method is designed to capture a relation where equations in a model have endogenous variables as exogenous. Since some of the explanatory variables are endogenous variables, the error terms of the equations are correlated, which simply violates the assumptions of Ordinary Least Square (Baltagi, 2008) .
In order to analyze the impact of institutional ownership on various strategic decisions of fi rms, the following regression models are specifi ed as:
where leverage (LEV), dividend yield (DY) and investment (INV) are dependent variables in these equations, showing a possible causality (two-way) relationship among them, since they also appear on the right side of the equation as exogenous variables. (e) represents the error terms for the equations 1, 2 and 3, and they are also assumed to be correlated. ROE, Size, TANG, Sales_GR, Size and Age are additional control variables in these equations, as offered Bokpin and Arko (2009); Chang et al., (2016) .
In order to confi rm the robustness of our results, the above equations are specifi ed with some dummy variables for capturing the cross industry-effects (Truong & Heaney, 2007) . Industry specifi c dummies are combined with the formal Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan in 2002, and all listed companies in Pakistan should follow a full representation to the CCGP. Considering the time effects, various year dummies are also added to account for the impact of institutional ownership and strategic decisions over time.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Tab. A.1 reports in Appendix the descriptive statistics of all variables. This table reports the mean or average value, the standard error of the mean, the median, the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for 1,502 observations. The mean or average value of LEV is 1.69 with a standard deviation of 1.48. Leverage value is higher and it shows a greater reliance of fi rms listed in the PSE on external sources of fi nancing, as reported earlier by Afza and Nazir (2015) . Thus, the average value of INV is .006%, with a standard deviation of .00046. The average institutional ownership in Pakistani fi rms is reported as 32.14% of total shares outstanding with a standard error of 0.63. Nevertheless, in order to check the heteroscedasticity, various White tests are applied. The results of these tests are reported in Tab. A.2 (Panel A) and the chi-square values confi rm the presence of heteroscedasticity in our model. Panel B also the probability of test statistics confi rms the presence of serial correlation. The correlation between the variables (Tab. A.3) for the sample selected is analyzed using the Pearson correlation. The result shows a positive correlation between institutional ownership and dividend yield. Thus, institutional ownership shows a slight negative correlation with leverage, whereas it seemed no correlation with investment.
The following Tab. 1 reports the corresponding results after 3SLS analysis of each models. The outcomes lead to the following implications. In model 1, the coeffi cient of dividend payouts (DPO) ratio (-0.711) is also negative and signifi cant at one percent. This confi rms the simultaneous determination of dividend and leverage. Consequently, we also claimed that fi rms use leverage and dividend as alternative monitoring devices. In other words, fi rms paying higher dividends fi nd debt a less attractive source of fi nancing (Ogden & Wu, 2013) . Moreover, fi rms with higher fi nancial costs are not ready to pay dividends. A higher fi rm leverage will lower the potential dividend payout to shareholders (Truong & Heaney, 2007) .
The leverage of fi rms (LEV) is negatively related to institutional ownership and the result 1, XXII, 2019 Finance is highly signifi cant. This result shows that institutional owners, regardless of their type, are hesitant to invest substantial stakes in fi rms that are highly leveraged. This negative and signifi cant relationship also supports the argument that institutional owners may act as a substitute for the monitoring role of debt in the capital structure of fi rms (Moh'd et al., 1998; Chung & Wang, 2014) . In this perspective, the reluctance of institutional owners to invest in highly leveraged fi rms may be due to their intention to avoid risk (Crutchley et al., 1999) .
The profi tability of a fi rm is also negatively related to the fi rm's leverage, and the coeffi cient is signifi cant at 95%. This result is in line with the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) , suggesting a negative relation due to the reliance of fi rms' internally generated funds. Essentially, fi rms' size has a positive role in determining the level of leverage. Consequently, bigger fi rms are more leveraged than smaller ones. The sales growth has positive and signifi cant results, as claimed Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008 
Tab. 1: Results of 3SLS Regressions Based on Equation 1, 2 and 3
Finance ownership and growth due to fact that growing fi rms tend not to transfer their wealth to creditors. Thus, tangibility has a negative and signifi cant relationship with leverage. The negative relation can be attributed to the presence of institutional or block-holder ownership which results in closer ties with lenders, thus reducing the need for more collateral (Deesomsak et al., 2004) . The results of second models highlight that the coeffi cient of investment (INV) and debt (LEV) with dividend is although negative, but insignifi cant in our models. Thus, the coeffi cients of institutional ownership (INST) are positively and signifi cantly correlated with dividend yield (DY). The reason for increased dividend levels can be the role of institutional shareholder voting rights for higher dividends to enhance managerial monitoring (Farinha, 2002) . Thus, one unit increase in profi tability ratios increased the level of dividends. This supports that more profi table fi rms with ceteris paribus higher levels of institutional ownership tend to pay more dividends than the less ones (Truong & Heaney, 2007) . Examining the signifi cant control variables, only Age shows a positive and substantial coeffi cient at 1%. These fi ndings consistent with the fi ndings of Thanatawee (2012) regarding the fi rms' tendency of paying increased dividends.
Nevertheless, the relationship of institutional ownership (INST) and the fi rm's investment (INV), as suggested by the third model, is negative. Although the result is statistically insignifi cant, the negative coeffi cient is in accordance with the fi ndings of Richardson (2006) . The short term focus of institutional investors may constrain the manager to reduce investment (Bushee, 1998) to avoid mispricing caused by disappointed institutional investors' selling.
The positive and signifi cant relation between age and investment variables also provides support for the same proposition. The coeffi cient of tangibility is signifi cant and positive, indicating that capital-intensive fi rms are still in the process of expansion. The same phenomenon is confi rmed by the signifi cant and positive relationship between sales growth and investment. The results indicate high sales growth requires the fi rm to place more money in expansion or project/production facilities. This consequence corresponds to the fi ndings of Jensen et al. (1992) . However, there is no evidence for simultaneity in dividend and investment decisions of fi rms, but results are seemed to consistent with the fi ndings of Fama (1974) .
Tab. 2 demonstrates the results of simultaneous equations where industry specifi c dummies are incorporated into the model. The omitted control dummy variable represents Engineering, which becomes a reference for all other industries. All the reported results remain the same in terms of their sign and signifi cance, with some exceptions. The coeffi cient of age in the fi rst leverage (LEV) model becomes signifi cant after the addition of dummies. In other words, one unit increase in age of fi rms seemed to decrease debt to equity ratio. Therefore, ageing fi rms are less levered in Pakistan. Thus, the negative impact of institutional ownership on fi rms' leverage becomes more pronounced after including industry specifi c dummies. Overall results are consistent with both analyses, suggesting that the specifi cations of our models are robust. The explanatory infl uence of the models has also increased after including industry specifi c variables. Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level of signifi cance. SE is robust standard error. Models correspond to the equations (1, 2 and 3) after incorporating industry dummies respectively. CHEM is chemical industry; CONS is construction and material industry; PAPER is paper & board industry; ENERG is fuel and energy sector; FOOD is food producer industry; PERSONAL is personal goods industry and MISC is miscellaneous industries.
Variables

Tab. 2: Results of 3SLS Regressions with sectoral dummies (Part 2)
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Essentially, additional time dummies are added to capture the effects of particular years affects the dividend equation. As a result, the size of fi rms (Size), the sales growth (SALES_ GR) and tangibility (TANG), which were previously insignifi cant, are substantial with the dividend model now, as reported in Tab. 3. Namely, if the sales growth is increased more dividends seemed to pay for stockholders. However, if there is one unit increase in size and tangibility of fi rms less disbursement are purchased to the owners. These results are similar with (Lin & Chang, 2011) These statistics are performed to analyze the expected difference between the coeffi cients using 2SLS and 3SLS methods. The reported values of them are 1.37, 1.39 and 0.69 respectively. These coeffi cients are insignifi cant in all models, and indicating no signifi cant difference between the two models for particular sets of system (Baltagi, 2008) . Previous studies (Chang et al., 2016) also confi rmed that the presence of outliers affects the overall explanatory power of the examined model. This 3SLS method applied on the 'winsorized' dataset to eliminate the effect of extreme values results in inconsistency (Wilson, 1993) . After removing these outliers, the results recently show improved explanatory power. However, general conclusions are given only if further determinants will be taken in to consideration to determine their effects on fi rms' strategic decision-making. Therefore, the validity of our results is limited by the bias caused by the exclusion of the omitted variables of our models. 
Conclusions
This research paper addresses an emerging dimension of fi rms' ownership; regarding institutional ownership and its interaction with major strategic fi nancial decisions, including leverage, dividend and investment decisions. Institutional ownership includes equity ownership by institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual and pension funds, and investment trusts. Previous literature supports the strong incentive of institutional investors to infl uence the fi rms' fi nancial decisions. The main result of this study supports the expected negative relation of institutional ownership and a fi rm's leverage decisions and a positive relation with a fi rm's dividend decisions.
Furthermore, the relationships among various strategic decisions differ in terms of the magnitude of effect and sensitivity. Dividend is a determinant of leverage decisions (provided by the negative and signifi cant coeffi cient), but leverage is not a simultaneous determinant of dividend or investment decisions. Consequently, Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** denote 5% and * denotes 10% level of signifi cance. SE is robust standard error. Models correspond to the equations (1, 2 and 3) respectively. 3SLS is applied using dummies to check robustness at the examined years.
Tab. 3: Results of 3SLS Regressions with time dummies (Part 2)
Finance high leverage fi rms pay lower dividends. These results can be aligned with the fi ndings of Jensen et al. (1992) . The negative and signifi cant correlation between institutional ownership and leverage also confi rms that institutional investors prefer low leveraged fi rms. Firms that aim to attract institutional investors for effective monitoring should consider this factor when choosing debt fi nancing. The signifi cant positive relationship between institutional ownership and fi rm dividend decisions suggests a preference among institutional investors for dividendpaying fi rms, as compared to fi rms do not pay stable dividends. Since, this study has not able to fi nd signifi cant two-way relations between institutional ownership and investment decisions, institutional investors rather focus on corporate governance and internal control of fi rms. Indeed, institutional investors should develop their governance role in order to improve the effi ciency of fi rms' management and governance. These investors play the same role as a 'watch dog' for companies, so fi rms should prefer institutional owners of their stocks. Besides, the presence of institutional investor monitoring the fi rms' better business performance (Rajnoha, Lesníková, & Krajčík, 2017) . These fi ndings have important implications for the future theoretical research in the fi eld of strategic management in general and corporate governance in particular.
The limitation of this study is that it focuses on the effects of institutional ownership on strategic decisions of fi rms listed in one Pakistani case. However, this study has future research potential to consider other emerging markets. Thus, the source of data has some limitations that should be kept all into mind while making such analysis (Sutopo, Kot, Adiati, & Lina Nur Ardila, 2018) .
Moreover, we concentrated on one type of business ownership i.e., institutional ownership. Our research can be further extended by considering insider ownership, family ownership and block-holder ownership, i.e. (Ahmad, Oláh, Popp, & Máté, 2018) . Hence, it is worth to redesign it by incorporating country specifi c factors, such as political and economic environment and global factors, i.e. economic crashes, natural disasters, along with fi rm specifi c factors, for improved results. 1, XXII, 2019 
